Book Reviews by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 87
Issue 1 Fall Article 6
Fall 1996
Book Reviews
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Book Reviews, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 315 (1996-1997)
0091-4169/96/8701-0315
THE JouRNAL OF CRIMINAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 87, No. I
Copyright © 1996 by Northwestern University, School of Law Pinted in U.S.A.
BOOK REVIEWS
IS JUSTICE JUST US? USING SOCIAL
SCIENCE TO INFORM SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN*
PAUL H. ROBINSON 8c JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995). 307 pp.
The relationship between popular opinion and law is a compli-
cated one, especially in a society like ours that is both democratic and
concerned about individual rights and moral justice. In this country
the tension has been apparent at least since the eighteenth century,
when James Madison and Alexander Hamilton clashed with the anti-
federalists over how "representative" the people's representatives
should be.' Ought law to be a reflection of the people's will, a distilla-
tion of the best theoretical insights, or some combination thereof and,
if the latter, how does one titrate the mixture of lay and theoretical
input?
In Justice, Liability and Blame, Paul Robinson, a well-known law
professor, and John Darley, a respected social scientist, force one to
ponder this question, in the stimulating context of fashioning crimi-
nal law doctrine. The book is primarily a description of eighteen stud-
ies aimed at probing community opinion about a wide range of
criminal law issues, including the act requirement for attempt, omis-
sion liability, accomplice liability, the felony-murder rule, and the in-
* Professor of Law & Alumni Research Scholar, University of Florida College of Law. I
would like to thank Frank Allen, Stephen Morse and the members of workshops at Florida
and Villanova law Schools for their helpful comments on this article. Of course, all blun-
ders are my own.
I See, e.g., THE FEDERALST No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the difference between
a "democracy" and a "republic," with the latter comprising a "delegation of the govern-
ment.., to a small number of citizens elected by the rest").
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toxication and insanity defenses. In presenting these studies, the
authors subscribe to two key premises. First, they believe that lay opin-
ion should influence substantive criminal law. Second, they believe
that they can accurately ascertain that opinion. After briefly describ-
ing the most intriguing findings of their research, this review analyzes
these two premises and concludes that both may require significant
caveats. The overall conclusion, however, is that the book is a major
breakthrough in the application of the scientific method to criminal
law issues, and should be viewed both as a rich source of ideas for
criminal theory and as a model for interdisciplinary work.
I. THE RESULTS
All of the studies in Justice, Liability and Blame followed the same
format. First, a group of lay subjects, usually around forty in number,
was selected. The group was then asked to read a series of scenarios
depicting variations on a core fact pattern. For instance, in the study
designed to plumb attitudes toward the act requirement for attempt,
the subjects read about Ray, a locksmith. In one scenario, Ray tells a
friend of his that he has decided to rob a safe in a coin shop, but does
nothing to implement this plan. In other scenarios he undertakes var-
ious steps before his plan is discovered, from reconnoitering the store
to opening the safe door. In the final scenario, he completes the
crime. After reading these scenarios, the subjects were asked to assign
to each a liability rating, on a thirteen-point scale that the authors
used throughout the research. 2 The authors then report the average
liability score of the group, as well as related information, for each
scenario.
Recounting all of the interesting findings discussed injustice, Lia-
bility and Blame would take up too much space. Instead, this review
canvasses the results which most directly challenge accepted common
law or Model Penal Code positions,3 since those results have the great-
est potential implications for the criminal law. Perhaps the most im-
portant overall finding in this regard is the significant conflict
between the lay subjects' opinions and the theory undergirding the
Model Penal Code (MPC). The Code generally endorses a "subjec-
tive" defendant-centered approach to assessment of criminal liability;
the subjects, in contrast, tended to evaluate liability from an "objec-
2 The scale ranged from 11, representing the death penalty, to 0, representing liability
but no punishment, and in addition had a thirteenth choice of "N", or no liability.
3 This review will not provide citations to the common law and Model Penal Code
positions to which it refers. Robinson and Darley do an excellent job of providing a sum-
mary of, and citations to, these positions, and the relevant citations can be found on the
pages of their book that are discussed (and cited) herein.
[Vol. 87
ISJUSTICEJUST US?
five" harm-oriented perspective, similar to that found in traditional
common law. A second important finding is the tendency of the lay
people in these studies to recognize fine gradations in determining
punishment. This tendency stands in contrast to the all-or nothing
approach to liability generally found in the criminal codes.
Illustrations of both types of attitudes are found in Study 1, in-
volving attempt.4 The MPC provides that any "substantial step" to-
ward completion of a crime that is corroborative of intent is sufficient
conduct for an attempt conviction. In contrast, Robinson and
Darley's subjects would impose5 little or no liability in such a situation,
even when the person has the purpose of committing the crime. In-
stead, they reserved significant punishment only for those who, acting
with the intent to commit the crime, have engaged in conduct which
demonstrates an unequivocal purpose or which comes dangerously
close to completing the offense (which is the common law approach).
The subjects also strongly rejected the Model Penal Code stance that
the punishment for attempt should be identical to the punishment for
the completed offense; instead, as under the common law, they indi-
cated that attempt should be graded much lower than the completed
crime. Further, contrary to both the MPC and the common law, the
subjects believed that renunciation of a completed offense should re-
sult in significant mitigation. At the same time, they indicated that
renunciation of an attempt should not be a complete defense to at-
tempt liability, as it is under the Model Penal Code, but rather should
be only a mitigating factor.
The subjects in Studies 2 and 3 also evidenced discomfort with
the Model Penal Code's subjective approach and with the law's prefer-
ence for rigid categories of liability. In Study 2,6 the subjects were
given a series of scenarios in which the actor intended to kill someone
else through poisoning, but which varied the risk of harm and the
degree of harm that could occur. The subjects indicated that the key
determinants of liability should be the actual probability the crime will
occur (rather than the probability perceived by the actor) and the
seriousness of the actual harm posed (rather than the harm intended
by the actor). Similarly, in Study 3,7 the subjects required actual en-
couragement for accomplice liability, thus rejecting the Model Penal
4 PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLY, JUSTICE, LmBiLrly, AND BLAME: COMMUNrIY
ViEws AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 14-28 (1995).
5 In the following description of the results, I will make statements like "the subjects
would impose" or "the subjects thought..." without specifying the precise percentage of
subjects who thought that way and without attempting to delve into the strength of that
belief. Methodological issues of this sort are dealt with in Part III.
6 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 4, at 28-33.
7 Id. at 33-42.
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Code's imposition of punishment for unsuccessful encouragement.
Further, in contrast to both the MPC and the common law, they rec-
ognized gradations of accomplice liability depending upon the actual
assistance provided, and under no circumstances were willing to give
the accomplice the same punishment as the principal.
In Study 4,8 which looked at lay attitudes toward omission liabil-
ity, the lay subjects felt that even a person with no duty toward a
drowning person should be liable for a failure to save (except when
there is significant danger in doing so). Conversely, even a person
with a significant duty to act and an ability to do so in an easy and safe
manner was not punished as severely as one with the same mental
state who affirmatively commits the act. Again, these results are con-
trary both to the MPC and to the common law.
The subjects were also much more willing to provide a 'justifica-
tion" defense than most codes. For instance, in Study 5,9 the subjects
were reluctant to punish a person who has the ability to retreat from
an attack. In Study 6,10 the subjects recognized a complete defense
for use of nondeadly force in defense of property, and assigned only
minimal liability to those who use deadly force in defense of property.
Similarly, in Study 7,11 the subjects seemed to believe that use of
deadly force should be permitted in effecting an arrest even if no of-
ficer is involved, and that negligently killing an innocent person in the
course of an arrest should result in little or no liability. All of these
results are in conflict with the Model Penal Code and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the common law.
Differences between the subjects and the law were apparent in
connection with mental state issues as well. Study 812 indicated that
subjects were willing to assign liability based on negligence; at the
same time, the subjects in Study 1113 believed that negligence should
be individuated (that is, reasonableness should be viewed from the
perspective of a person "in the actor's situation"14). While acceptance
of negligence as a basis for liability is closer to the common law than
the MPC (which recognizes such liability only in connection with
8 Id. at 42-50.
9 Id. at 54-64.
10 Id. at 64-72.
11 Id. at 72-79.
12 Id. at 84-96.
13 Id. at 116-23.
14 This phrase is found in several provisions of the Model Penal Code, see, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE §§2.02(2)(c)-(d) (1985) (defining recklessness and negligence); id.
§ 210.3((1) (b) (defining manslaughter), and is designed to permit the factfinder to con-
sider some (usually unspecified) individual aspects of the offender and his or her environ-
ment. See id. §§ 2.02 cmt. 4, 242.
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homicide and a few other areas), the individuation of negligence is
closer to the MPC position in those cases when it does permit punish-
ment for negligent acts. Indeed, the subjects in Study 11 appeared
willing to go further than the MPC in this regard. They indicated that
a person's heredity and intelligence should be considered part of the
actor's "situation"; even the MPC, while generally open to individua-
tion, specifically labels these factors irrelevant in its commentary. A
third study about mental state,15 Study 9, found that lay people were
willing to impose accomplice liability (albeit at a minimal level) even
in cases where a person is only reckless as to the outcome of his or her
encouragement. This result also diverges from the legal view, which
requires the accomplice to have either puipose or knowledge as to the
principal's conduct (perhaps because, in contrast to what the subjects
in Study 3 would do, the law punishes the accomplice like a princi-
pal). Finally, Study 10,16 on voluntary intoxication, found that a per-
son's intentions as to causing death at the time of becoming
intoxicated (as opposed to at the time of the death) is a very impor-
tant variable to lay subjects, whereas it is irrelevant under the MPC
and the common law.
Two of the three studies on excuses produced interesting diver-
gences between lay and legal opinion. Study 1217 found that, in con-
trast to the federal insanity test, but consonant with the MPC's
approach, volitional dysfunction due to mental illness is considered a
ground for exculpation by the subjects. In Study 1418 the subjects in-
dicated that entrapment depends upon the degree of coercion by the
government agent, not the target's predisposition or the immoral na-
ture of the police conduct (the two competing legal criteria for an
entrapment defense). Thus, while the MPC and the common law
make entrapment a separate defense, to the subjects entrapment is
synonymous with duress and could be folded into that doctrine. 19
The final four studies have to do with what the authors categorize
as "grading" issues. Not surprisingly, given the fact that they were
drafted in the 1950s, the MPC's provisions on rape are viewed as out-
dated by the subjects. In Study 1520 the subjects indicated that spousal
rape and rape involving homosexual couples deserved approximately
equal punishment, contrary to the three-decade-old MPC provisions,
15 ROBINSON & DARLFi, supra note 4, at 96-105.
16 Id. at 105-15.
17 Id. at 128-39.
18 Id. at 147-55.
19 Study 13, id. at 139-47, studied lay reactions to immaturity and involuntary
intoxication.
20 Id. at 160-69.
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which treat spousal rape more leniently and homosexual rape more
harshly. A similar rejection of traditional doctrine occurred in Study
16,21 where the subjects were unwilling to subscribe to the common
law felony-murder doctrine. While the common law elevates to mur-
der any killing which occurs in the course of a designated felony, the
subjects assigned the felon only manslaughter liability when he negli-
gently kills during a robbery, and only negligent homicide liability
when a bystander kills a co-felon. (Further, consistent with the results
in Study 3, this study found that subjects gave accomplices to felony
murder much less punishment than the perpetrator.) In Study 17,22
the subjects did not see causation as an all-or-nothing construct, as the
codes do, but rather correlate degree of liability with the extent of
causation. Finally, in Study 18,23 when asked to sentence an individ-
ual who committed numerous similar offenses in a short period of
time, subjects rejected both consecutive and concurrent sentences
equivalents, instead opting for a sentence in-between these two tradi-
tional sentencing patterns.
In addition to the specific findings in these eighteen studies, the
authors offer a few overarching conclusions, 24 two of which have al-
ready been noted. As demonstrated in Studies 1, 2, 3, and 9, the type
and probability of harm risked by the actor's conduct are very impor-
tant determinants of liability as far as the people in this research are
concerned. Further, as illustrated in virtually all the studies, the sub-
jects tended to grade liability on a continuum, rather than dividing
the scenarios between those which demonstrated no liability and
those which merited full liability. Two other relatively common find-
ings are mentioned by the authors at the end of the book. First, a
large percentage of the subjects were willing to assign a verdict of "lia-
bility but no punishment" in a number of situations (e.g., when the
actor merely took a "substantial step" or when a stranger failed to save
a drowning victim), suggesting to the authors that these subjects be-
lieve the moral message of the law may be important to enforce even
when they think the particular person involved is "blameless."25 Sec-
ondly, in a number of scenarios involving defenses (Studies 5, 6 and
7), the subjects were reluctant to impose punishment on defendants.
The authors suggest this leniency might be due to a belief that the
criminal justice system is ineffective in protecting citizens, who are
thus entitled to take the law into their own hands; alternatively, the
21 Id. at 169-81.
22 Id. at 181-89.
23 Id. at 189-97.
24 Id. at 204-12.
25 Id. at 209-11.
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authors speculate, it may reflect the belief that defenders of property
and of other people should not have to make complex calculations as
to what kind of threat is present and what kind of response to the
threat is reasonable. 26
II. RELEVANCE
A criminal law theorist might respond to the foregoing findings
with a dismissive "So what?" Of what relevance to criminal law are the
musings of unsophisticated lay people?
Robinson and Darley offer two answers to this question. First,
they say that public opinion might help inform the retributive judg-
ments that many think should dominate the culpability structure of
the law. As the authors put it, "if a rule derived by desert theorists is
judged overwhelmingly by the community to be unjust, such disagree-
ment may cast some doubt upon the accuracy of the rule in assessing a
person's moral blameworthiness, at least suggesting that closer scru-
tiny of the reasoning behind the rule is required."27 In other words,
while community sentiment should not be considered dispositive of
the issue, it can at least be "one source of determining what counts as
the just desert."28 Further, Robinson and Darley assert, when code
drafters disagree about the "moral intuitions" of the community, "em-
pirical findings.., should be of considerable utility in resolving the
controversy."29
The second reason the authors consider their empirical work use-
ful is utilitarian in nature. Relying on other empirical work that sug-
gests that people obey the law not just out of fear of punishment but
because they want to be law-abiding citizens,30 the authors claim that a
substantial gap between community sentiment and the criminal law
may reduce the latter's "moral credibility," and thus people's willing-
ness to comply with it. In the authors' words:
The legal system that the community perceives as unjustly criminalizing
certain conduct is one that is likely to cause the society governed by
those laws to lose faith in the system-not only in the specific laws that
lead to the unjust result, but in the entire code and criminal justice sys-
tem enforcing that code. The reverse is also true. A rule that is strongly
and persistently supported by the community as accurately reflecting
moral blameworthiness but that is not followed by the criminal justice
system raises similar destructive possibilities. The community is likely to
engage in extralegal vigilante actions, with all of the dangers that that
26 Id. at 207.
27 Id. at 6.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 214.




Thus, the authors argue, research such as theirs identifying differ-
ences between lay and legal opinion can assist in the utilitarian aim of
ensuring compliance with the law, not only by the public at large, but
also by those involved in the criminal process, such as offenders, wit-
nesses and jurors.3 2
The desert-based and utilitarian arguments offered by Robinson
and Darley persuasively demonstrate why empirical research can stim-
ulate thought about criminal law. But the authors sometimes sound
as if they have been seduced by these arguments into believing that
findings such as theirs are worth even greater attention. Consider, for
instance, the conclusions they draw from the four general findings
described at the end of the previous section. They state that the sub-
jects' repeated preference for the harm-oriented approach to liability
"suggests that codes ought to distinguish and punish more severely
instances where the prohibited harm actually occurs or the prohibited
conduct is actually consummated, as compared to instances where the
harm or evil is only intended (but not carried to completion). " 3
Given the subjects' consistent view of blameworthiness as a contin-
uum,3 4 they argue that the substantive criminal law should recognize
more grades of offenses than it does, and that even eight or nine
grades might not be enough.35 They propose a third verdict in addi-
tion to guilty and not guilty, which they suggest could be called a
"blameless violation," to reflect more accurately the subject's desires
in those situations where they chose the "liability but no punishment"
option;3 6 they add that, "In future research, one could allow for such
verdicts from subjects and test the conditions under which they would
use each,"37 presumably to see when the verdict should be used. Fi-
nally, the authors state that the studies on defense of property and
person "suggest different grading than current law for most of the
doctrines that concern errors in justification." 38 With the exception
of the third proposal, 39 the authors do not explicitly advance any rea-
son, other than the data, for adopting their suggestions.
31 Id. at 7 (foomotes omitted).
32 Id. at 6.
33 Id. at 206.
34 Id. at 208-09.
35 Id. at 198.
36 Id. at 212.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 206.
39 They note that the "blameless violation" verdict would avoid both the jury's "di-
lemma" in situations where the conduct is inappropriate but the act was blameless, and the
"perversion" of the law that might occur in these cases, id. at 211-12, and also cite to Paul
Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Criminal Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 729 (1990).
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Given statements elsewhere in the book,40 it is clear that the au-
thors do not adopt the position that their findings should necessarily
drive the content of the criminal code. Nonetheless, the assuredness
with which they offer these four changes is disconcerting. When the
law explicitly or implicitly asks empirical questions (e.g., about what
people believe, or about how they act), survey research of the type
carried out here is highly germane.41 However, when the law is at-
tempting to settle normative-moral issues, as it does when developing
substantive criminal law, lay opinion should not be considered more
than tenuously relevant, much less dispositive. Both of Robinson and
Darley's arguments, to the extent they are relied upon to suggest
otherwise, are subject to serious challenge.
A. RELEVANCE TO RETRBUTrVE AIMS
There is no way to escape the fact that, at a very basic level, the
values of the community govern the content of the criminal law: mur-
der, rape and robbery are crimes because we, as a community, find
these acts reprehensible. Indeed, the criminal law would not exist
were it not for the "moral intuitions" of society.42 Further, when it
comes to finetuning the scope of these laws (which is essentially what
Robinson and Darley's work is aimed at), there is no doubt that de-
scriptions of community sentiment can provide theorists with useful
food for thought; for example, for those readers who teach or practice
criminal law, the brief description of Robinson and Darley's findings
set out above undoubtedly triggered numerous stimulating specula-
tions as to why the subjects responded the way they did.
But to say that the results are interesting is not to say they should
be adopted as policy, or even that they should help battling code-
drafting groups decide which option to choose. Beyond establishing
the fundamental issues upon which virtually everyone agrees (e.g.,
that unjustified homicide should be a crime), lay opinions about the
content of the criminal code are of questionable value. In Robinson
40 For instance, in addition to those statements already noted, the authors describe the
question as to whether legal codes should "be modified to match ... community standards
or at least to move in their direction" as "an extraordinarily complex question." ROBINSON
& DARLEY, supra note 4, at 81. Robinson's many other writings reflect the same view. See,
e.g., Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theoiy
in Ciminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REv. 1 (1985).
41 For instance, I have recently investigated the extent to which the U.S. Supreme
Court's views of what it terms "reasonable expectations of privacy" conform with society's
views of privacy. Christopher Slobogin &Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recog-
nized and Permitted by Society," 42 Dmcu L.J. 727 (1993).
42 Cf EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DrISION OF LABOR IN SOCIErY 102 (1960) (arguing that
crime helps define and is defined by the "collective conscience" of the community).
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and Darley's vernacular, a good argument can be made that commu-
nity rejection of a particular position of the criminal law-even if it is
"overwhelming"-should generally not "count" in determining just
desert.
The argument is simply this: the community upon which Robin-
son and Darley rely for their input on moral intuitions is generally
uninformed-both in the sense that it has not thought deeply about
the relevant issues, and in the sense that it does not know the legal
context in which a given legal provision operates. Therefore, contrary
to Robinson and Darley's apparent suggestion, even knowledge that
the community resoundingly disfavors a particular legal formulation
should usually be irrelevant to deserts analysis; while such knowledge
might trigger reconsideration of a given rule, it should not carry any
weight in deciding whether that rule is morally defensible.
An anecdotal example may be the best way of illustrating this
point. Each year on the first or second day of criminal law class I poll
my brand new law students on the issue of whether the penalty for
attempt should be the same as for the completed crime. Invariably,
the vast majority answer no, in agreement with Robinson and Darley's
subjects in Study 1. This year I decided to ask the class the same ques-
tion seven weeks into the semester. This second vote indicated that
roughly 75% of the class now believed the penalty for attempt should
be identical to the penalty for the completed crime. Presumably the
students changed their minds because they understood that luck and
fortuity do not diminish culpability, and because they recognized that
a penalty differential is not necessary to "deter" attempters from com-
pleting the crime in jurisdictions which recognize a renunciation de-
fense. The first reason for the change in position reflects a deeper
appreciation of the blameworthiness assessment associated with the
criminal law, while the second reason stems from knowledge of how
different sections of the criminal codes interact with each other. Lay
subjects are unlikely to have either perspective. Thus their answer to
the penalty question cannot be taken seriously as a normative matter.
One might object that the students' second vote is not necessarily
any more correct than the first vote. After all, prominent scholars
have sought to justify, on theoretical grounds, a penalty differential
between attempt and the completed crime.43 Accepting this point
43 E.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, A CRiME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRAL 67 (1988):
The imperative to do justice requires that we heed the suffering of the victims, that we
inquire at trial whether the defendant is responsible for that suffering, and we adjudge
him guilty, if the facts warrant it, not for antiseptically violating the rules of the system,
but for inflicting a wrong on the body and to the dignity of the victim.
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does not thereby resurrect the usefulness of opinion surveys, however.
The very argument that one position is more correct than the other
renders community sentiment irrelevant, or at least of only rhetorical
value; if theoretical arguments are necessary for determining when lay
opinion should influence retributive judgments, one doesn't need the
opinion in the first place.4
This example suggests a related reason for distrusting lay opinion
as a basis for retributive judgments: its variability. The change in vote
on the part of my students illustrates that one's position depends
upon the information at one's disposal; thus, "overwhelming" commu-
nity support for a particular stance may in fact be quite fragile. Fur-
ther, the effect of more "information" is not always felicitous. An
approach relying even partially on community sentiment is subject to
significant changes based on dramatic events or political fads that may
distort lay reasoning. The justification studies in Robinson and
Darley's book-all of which registered a permissive attitude toward
acts committed in defense of self or property-may be a prime exam-
ple of this phenomenon. More specifically, they may be an artifact of
recent "self-help" attitudes birthed during an era of routine harping
on the "crime problem" by the media and politicians. Robinson and
Darley themselves express surprise at their subjects' stance on the use
of deadly force to effect an arrest; as they state "[w]e had expected
that the use of deadly force would be more widely condemned in cases
where . . . the damage is already done and the force is being used
aggressively (rather than defensively) to arrest the offender."45 Yet
the only way to justify giving this finding less credence in determining
just deserts than any of the other findings of their research is to make
judgments based on policy and theory, once again rendering secon-
dary the empirical results.
None of this is meant to diminish the authors' initial statements
about the importance of empirical work to deserts analysis. Their
findings certainly could, and probably will, make theorists, especially
adherents of the MPC, rethink their positions. This cautionary effect
is all to the good. The primary criticism, again, is that the authors
seem to forget this relatively collateral role for empirical research
Id. at 67.
44 Lest the attempt example seem too anecdotal (i.e., isolated), I did the same "experi-
ment" with accomplice liability. In the first vote the vast majority of students indicated that
accomplices who merely attempted to assist (but were unsuccessful in dbing so) were
either not liable or only minimally so (analogous to the results in Study 3); several weeks
later, after having studied accomplice liability (but without having discussed the penalty
issue), virtually the entire class indicated it thought such a person should be punished, and
roughly one-quarter thought he should be punished at the same level as the principal.
45 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 4, at 79.
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when they come to the last part of the book and jump into making
recommendations.
B. RELEVANCE TO UTILITARIAN AIMS
The second argument that Robinson and Darley make for paying
attention to empirical results like theirs is the utilitarian notion that
compliance with the criminal law is most effectively encouraged by
ensuring that it does not stray too far from community mores. As with
the first argument, this contention can only be pushed so far. To the
extent it is used to justify changing theoretically sound law because of
community sentiment,46 it needs to be advanced with caution.
The assumption that a gap between lay opinion and law will un-
dermine willing compliance is open to question on a number of
grounds. First, of course, it is not clear whether people are aware of
the types of gaps that Robinson and Darley identify. Second, even if
they were, it is not clear that the effect would be disobedience to the
criminal law. Most of the research which supports the legitimacy-com-
pliance correlation looks at the extent to which people will obey the
laws they find illegitimate (e.g., prohibitions against use of marijuana
or gambling), not at whether the presence of laws viewed as illegiti-
mate increases disobedience to all laws.47 Other research suggests
that one's willingness to obey the law depends to some extent on
one's respect for legal authorities, as opposed to the law itself.48 Thus,
the research on the legitimacy-compliance correlation presumably
says very little about whether disagreements over relatively arcane as-
pects of the law of homicide, rape or theft (the crimes that are found
most frequently in Robinson and Darley's scenarios) will affect com-
pliance either with respect to those laws or to criminal laws gener-
ally.49 One would like to know, for instance, whether there is any
evidence of increased disrespect for the law in those jurisdictions
which follow the MPG approaches so disfavored by Robinson's and
Darley's subjects. At the least, one would expect that the gap would
have to be fairly significant and well-known for it to have this effect.
46 I have cited Robinson for the proposition that law which follows community senti-
ment is more likely to be followed. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness as a Criterion in the
Criminal Process, in LAw, MENTAL HEALTH, & MENTAL DIsoRDER 365-66 (Bruce Sales &
Daniel Shuman eds., 1996). But the further proposition that theoretically sound law
should be changed so that it is more likely to be followed is more problematic.
47 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 4, at 202-03.
48 Id. at 203.
49 Indeed, Tyler, who is the leading researcher in this area, states at several points in his
book that people usually obey laws with which they disagree. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAw 45-46, 64 (1990) ("People generally feel that law breaking is morally wrong,
and that they have a strong obligation to obey laws even if they disagree with them.").
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Further, as Robinson and Darley recognize,50 even assuming that
a gap between lay opinion and the law could create disrespect for the
law and that this disrespect would substantially affect compliance,
changing the law is not the only option. Properly explained, the law
can affect public opinion as well as jury behavior, as the history of
Brown v. Board ofEducationP' demonstrates. Thus, on this view, empiri-
cal work is again only marginally relevant to the normative enterprise
of devising criminal law. Rather, its main importance would lie in al-
erting policymakers to those rules which most need to be explained to
be public, both as a way of facilitating deterrence and of ensuring
compliance. On the assumption that the average jury would have simi-
lar views to the community as a whole, information about a "gap"
would also be very useful to litigators, who could use the information
in making arguments to and proposing instructions for the jury.52
If this educational endeavor fails, we may be faced with a stark
choice between two rules: a rule that reflects sensible just desert prin-
ciples, and a rule that does not but that is more likely to be followed
and less likely to create disrespect for the system as a whole. Perhaps
we should choose the latter.53 It appears that the drafters of the
Model Penal Code made just such a choice when they veered from
their usual subjective approach by creating a differential in penalty
between attempted murder and murder and by retaining a harm ele-
ment in many crimes.54 On the other hand, perhaps the drafters
should have had the courage of their convictions. If a criminal law
class can have its collective mind changed, perhaps the populace as a
whole can as well.
III. WEIGHT
The argument to this point has been that, while Robinson and
Darley's findings can suggest hypotheses for theoreticians, and can
also help policymakers and litigants pinpoint those situations where
50 [S]uppose our sort of empirical research reveals that the proposed formulation is
in some way at significant odds with the community's view. Then, such conflict ought
to be taken into account in debating the provision and, if the counterintuitive provi-
sion is finally adopted, community education about the provision would be required.
ROBINSON & DARi., supra note 4, at 215.
51 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52 ROBINSON & DARI.EY, supra note 4, at 3-4.
53 For instance, the widespread disobedience of Prohibition laws in the 1920s may have
been good reason for repealing those laws. But the laws with which Robinson and Darley
deal are much less likely to be disobeyed and do not deal with well-ingrained lifestyle
preferences.
54 Robinson makes this point in one of his articles. Paul Robinson, The Role of Harm and




lay persons are most likely to misunderstand the purpose of the crimi-
nal law, they are rarely of assistance in deciding whether a given rule
should be promulgated. It appears that Robinson and Darley disagree
with this position; perhaps others do as well. 55
However one comes out on the relevance issue, one still needs to
address the weight issue, which can be posed as follows: How much
credence, for any purpose, should be given results like those pro-
duced by Robinson and Darley? To social scientists, the answer to this
question reduces to an assessment of methodology. Here, as with the
relevance issue, Robinson and Darley recognize possible problems,
but occasionally are less self-critical than they could have been. A few
of these potential flaws will be noted here.
First, as pointed out earlier, the size of the sample in each study
was relatively small, hovering around forty.56 If the samples had been
randomly selected, this number might have been barely sufficient as a
statistical matter. However, Robinson and Darley state that they
"grabbed whomever [they] could get their hands on,"57 which is
hardly a random selection process. At the same time, this sampling
flaw probably was not decisively damaging. The authors' report on
the demographic traits of 307 of the subjects suggests a fairly diverse,
representative group overall (although the socioeconomic status of
these subjects is probably above the national median). 58 Moreover,
the authors emphasize that these are merely "pilot" studies, designed
to test the efficacy of a larger project.59
A second problem with ascribing any moral importance to the
types of results obtained by Robinson and Darley is that we do not
55 Fletcher does, at least sometimes. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 43, at 66 (where, in
connection with the penalty-for-attempt issue, he describes with disapproval "[t he modem
approach to crime [which] dismisses as subrational the argument that people simply feel
that actually killing someone is far worse than trying to kill"). Similarly, Holmes is well-
known for his statement that the "felt necessities of the time," among other things, "have
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Yet, of
course, both men have constructed elaborate theories of the criminal law, relying on much
more than their interpretation of community sentiments.
I must admit that I too have suggested that community sentiment might be relevant in
determining the content of the criminal law, specifically in fixing the scope of the insanity
defense. Norman J. Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity, Justifcation and Excuse: To-
ward a Unifying Schema, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 447, 449 (1995) (noting that if laypeople
rely heavily on justification principles in determining the criminal responsibility of men-
tally ill offenders, a case for replacing traditional insanity tests with a "quasi-subjective"
justification defense might be bolstered). This review serves as a caveat to that assertion.
56 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 4, at 223.
57 Id. at 222.
58 Id. at 223.
59 Id. at 10-11.
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know if the subjects were basing their liability assessments on "moral
intuition," as Robinson and Darley assert, or on some other ground.
Conceivably, deterrent, incapacitative or "irrelevant" concerns could
have been driving their decisions. The finding in study 15 that sub-
jects thought homosexual acts should not be criminalized may be at-
tributable to a belief that such acts are not blameworthy, or it may
merely reflect the assumption that, while immoral, the acts are not
deterrable, or would divert too much of society's resources or pry too
seriously into privacy if prosecuted. The finding in Study 1660 that
felony perpetrators should not suffer as much punishment when the
victim of the felony, rather than the perpetrator, kills another may
reflect a conclusion that the perpetrator in the former scenario is less
dangerous, rather than less blameworthy.61
Third, because it used written scenarios, the research may suffer
in terms of what social scientists term "external validity," or the extent
to which the subjects' responses would be replicated in .the real world.
In this regard, scenarios are better than conclusory questions (which
might merely ask, for example, whether the penalty for attempt
should be the same as for the completed crime). But they clearly can-
not simulate an actual offense, with all the added emotional and fac-
tual elements. In the authors' defense, there is an inherent tension
between external validity and "internal validity"-the more realistic
one's experimental framework becomes, the less control one has over
the independent variables because there are so many of them. The
scenario-approach allowed the researchers to modify only the vari-
ables in which they were most interested.62 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, in one significant sense the external validity of this research was
quite high; like Robinson and Darley's scenario-readers, policymakers
usually consider criminal law provisions in relatively abstract terms as
well.
A fourth potential problem with the research is that it used a
"within-subjects" design. In other words, rather than giving different
versions of the same scenario to different subjects, the same subjects
received all variations of the scenario. The authors note that this de-
sign allowed them to avoid the distortion of results that might occur
in a between-subjects design, when everyone exposed to one version
60 See RoBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 4, at 178-79.
61 Cf FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION 66 (1995) (noting that
"perceptions of dangerousness might well influence the community's perception of
desert").
62 For example, in the omission study it allowed them to vary the inconvenience of




of a scenario could be more "conservative" (or more "liberal") than
those exposed to a second version of the scenario.63 But this problem
can easily be avoided by adequate randomization of the samples that
receive the various scenarios. At the same time, the within-subjects
approach creates a problem of its own; as the authors note, the vari-
ables being tested will be very obvious to the subjects,64 who may con-
clude that they should therefore register some difference between the
scenarios even if they in fact see no difference. Although the authors
assured the subjects that it was acceptable to find no liability differ-
ences between the scenarios, and also report that the subjects "fre-
quently" gave "no difference" responses to clearly different
scenarios,65 the problem cannot be easily dismissed. Using a between-
subjects design, I gave my students-before we had discussed the rele-
vant topics-most of the scenarios in Study 1 (on attempt), Study 3
(on accomplice liability) and Study 4 (on omission liability).
Although the results I obtained were, for the most part, very similar to
those obtained by Robinson and Darley, a couple of them were signifi-
cantly different, in the hypothesized direction of finding less of a lia-
bility difference between scenarios than did Robinson and Darley's
within-subjects design. 66
A fifth possible problem with the research is the use of a ratings
scale with uneven intervals. One of the innovations of Robinson's and
Darley's empirical project is their thirteen-point liability scale. Rather
than forcing the subjects to choose between two or three options, as is
common in most research about the criminal law, this scale allowed
subjects to indicate their beliefs along a continuum ranging from no
liability to the death penalty. In an effort to track the typical offense
classification scheme in the United States, however, the points on the
scale do not represent equal time increments (e.g., 2 years, 4 years, 6
years), but rather are heavily loaded on one end toward minimal pen-
alties (no liability, liability without punishment, 1 day, 2 weeks, 2
63 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 4, at 221.
64 Id. at 222.
65 Id.
66 The two significant differences: in the attempt study, my students assigned almost
the same liability to the "unequivocality" scenario as they did to the "dangerous proximity"
scenario, contrary to what Robinson and Darley found (see id. at 20 tbl. 2.2), and in the
accomplice study they assigned almost the same liability to the "minimal help" scenario as
they did to the "necessary help" and "mastermind" scenarios, again contrary to what Robin-
son and Darley found (see id. at 36 tbl. 2.9). On the other hand, as the text notes, my
students' other liability ratings were very similar to those produced by Robinson and
Darley's, not just in relative but in absolute terms. Furthermore, I only had 9 students in
each "cell," well below what a good sample should be. My only point is that a between-
subjects approach can produce different results than a within-subjects approach, with the
latter perhaps exaggerating ratings variations between different scenarios.
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months, 6 months, 1 year) and "geometrically" increasing penalties on
the other (3 years, 7 years, 15 years, 30 years, life imprisonment, and
the death penalty). Other research suggests that subjects using this
type of scale may treat the intervals as equal rather than uneven. 67 If
so, any findings about absolute liability may be significantly distorted.
Since Robinson and Darley were primarily interested in relative liability
assessments, this artifact, if it exists, is not a significant problem for
them, but it does call into question one aspect of their research, to be
noted below.
A final observation has to do not with the methodology of the
research but with the interpretation of the results. In general, Robin-
son and Darley do a superlative job presenting and describing their
results through tables, charts and text. One concern, however, is that
their interpretations of the results rely heavily on the averages (i.e.,
means) of the subjects' liability ratings. Using an average as a unit of
measurement can be misleading, for a number of reasons. For in-
stance, it may mask an "even" distribution, in which there is no clus-
tering of ratings, but rather all parts of the liability spectrum are
represented. Or it may mask "bimodal" distributions, i.e., distributions
which occur when subjects are roughly evenly split between a high
and a low liability rating. One way of discovering whether the former,
and to some extent the latter, type of distribution has occurred is
through computing the standard deviation, which provides a measure
of the "variance" from the mean. Robinson and Darley report that for
many scenarios the standard deviation was around 1.39, which sug-
gests high agreement among the subjects, but that for about 20 per-
cent of the scenarios it exceeded 3.50, a figure which suggests
considerable disagreement among the subjects. 68 Since the authors
do not report the standard deviations for any given study, we cannot
be sure how much confidence to give any particular results.
Did these various characteristics of the authors' research method-
ology skew their findings? There is no way of knowing until research
using other methodologies is undertaken. Consider for a moment,
however, the possible effect these characteristics may have had on the
four primary findings described in this review. The finding that the
subjects view harm to be more important than subjective liability
could be due to the sterile nature of the scenarios, which may fail to
67 Paul Slovic &John Monahan, Probability, Danger, and Coercion: A Study of Risk Perception
and Decision Making in Mental Health Law, 19 IAw & HuMAN BEHAV. 49, 61-62 (1995) (in
comparing results using an even-interval scale and a uneven-interval scale, the numbers on
the latter scale "appear to have been meaningless in an absolute sense, though they were
consistent and meaningful in a relative sense.").
68 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 4, at 226.
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get across the evilness of a non-harmer or the extent to which luck
contributed to the absence of harm. The subjects' penchant for grad-
ing on a continuum might reflect the variable-enhancing effects of the
within-subjects design. The selection of the "liability but no punish-
ment" option might not have been a conscious decision to recognize
inappropriate but blameless conduct, but merely an effort to assign
liability at the low end of the scale. And, as with the subjects' rejection
of the subjective liability approach, the apparent findings of vigilante
tendencies on the part of the subjects might reflect problems with
external validity (is it really O.K. to use deadly force to defend property
or arrest?). Alternatively, as the authors themselves recognize, 69 the
averages reported in the justification studies might mask a bimodal
distribution caused when subjects who are asked whether a defense
should be recognized split relatively evenly in their answers.
Again, the foregoing comments are speculation, offered merely
as a way of demonstrating the difficulty of obtaining a true reflection
of the community's views. In general, Robinson and Darley's method-
ology is meticulous and one that should be emulated by others, with
only small adjustments. Some specific positive aspects of their ap-
proach included "manipulation checks" (i.e., asking questions to de-
termine whether the subjects' understanding of the scenarios
conformed with the researcher's intent) and randomizing the presen-
tation of the scenarios, so as to avoid order effects.70 The scenarios
themselves, although sparse, cleverly presented the relevant legal is-
sues in factual form. In short, the authors' methodology is far supe-
rior to that used by other researchers in the criminal law area.
IV. CONCLUSION
It may be, as Roscoe Pound stated, that "[i]n all cases of diver-
gence between the standard of the common law and the standard of
the public, it goes without saying that the latter will prevail in the
end."' 71 But, at least in the context of finetuning criminal law, it will
usually be preferable to eliminate any divergence by changing the
public's standard rather than changing well-reasoned legal provisions,
both because the public's uninformed "moral intuition" is suspect,
and because we cannot be sure what that intuition is. Even if we can-
not change the public's standard in such a situation, we should still
resist any tendency to adopt it; in the usual case, rather than construct
a criminal code based on the unschooled, variable intuitions of the
69 Id. at 294 n.7.
70 Id. at 220-22.
71 Roscoe Pound, The Need ofa SociologicalJurispmdence 19 GREEN BAG 607, 615 (1907).
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community, we should let the jury and the sentencing process operate
as occasional safety valves.72
The conflict between democracy and justice is a large subject and
has only been hinted at here. It is worth thinking about at length.78
Robinson and Darley's Justice, Liability and Blame provides an excellent
springboard for doing so. At the same time, it generates numerous
interesting hypotheses for criminal theoreticians. Finally, it teaches
useful lessons to all those who would do social science in the service of
the law.
72 Robinson and Darley do not like this solution. They argue that reliance on jury
nullification violates the principle of legality, and has other damaging effects as well.
ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 4, at 213. But all of their arguments assume that what the
jury decides is morally correct. Changing a law so that the jury won't nullify is no better
than changing a law simply because the community doesn't like it. With respect to using
sentencing as a safety valve, they correctly point out that, in many jurisdictions, sentencing
guidelines are too rigid to allow much flexibility and that, in any event, judges may not
reflect community sentiments in the way the jury does. Id. at 213-14. Whether these con-
straints on sentencing are good or bad depends, again, on what one thinks about demo-
cratic influences on punishment and whether the punishment scheme, whatever it is, can
be rationalized on desert and other principled grounds.
73 Cf LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 48 (1968) (describing the difference be-
tween "made" law and custom as "pervasive and perennial in legal philosophy" but avoid-
ing saying which of these viewpoints is "'right'").
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CRIMES INVOLVING ART
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JOHN E. CONKLIN, ART CRIME (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers,
1994) 322 pp.
Art crime is big business. It is estimated that thieves steal over
$1 billion worth of art each year.' Combining these losses with addi-
tional losses from other types of art crime, such as fraud, forgery, van-
dalism, and lost productivity in the workplace due to violence arising
in connection with art crime, makes art crime the second largest inter-
national criminal endeavor-only drug smuggling involves more
money.2 John Conklin's Art Crime attempts to bring a framework to
the study of art crime.
Professor Conklin defines "art" as those types of objects typically
displayed in a museum of fine arts.3 Obviously, this narrow definition
ignores a number of types of art that are also subject to criminal be-
havior.4 "Art crimes" are defined as "criminally punishable acts that
involve works of art."5 However, Professor Conklin frequently strays
from this strict definition by giving examples of various types of behav-
ior that, although not criminal, some would argue should be
criminal. 6
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. BA 1985, Amherst
College; J.D. 1988, Harvard Law School.
1 SeeJOHN E. CONKLIN, ART CRIME 4, 119 (1994). See also Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit
Trade in Cultural Property: Does The UNIDROJT Convention Provide An Effective Remedy For The
Shortcomings Of The UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 473 (1994); Lisaj.
Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting And A Proposed Legal Alternativ4 95
COLUM. L. REV. 377, 377-78 (1995) (estimating art crime levels in 1993 to be between $3
and $6 billion).
2 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 4; Leah E. Eisen, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft,
Statutes Of Limitations, And Title Disputes In The Art World, 81 J. C~iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1067, 1068 (1991); MichaelJ. Kelly, Conflicting Trends In The International Trade Of Art And
Antiquities: Restitutio in Integrum and Possessio Animo Ferundi/Lucrand4 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 31,
31 (1995); Lenzner, supra note 1, at 473.
3 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 4.
4 E.g., Conklin's definition does not cover performing artists, and he does not discuss
the significant trade in pirated recordings.
5 Id. at 3.
6 See, e.g., id. at 101-07.
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This book is at its best when describing how the art world works,
the various types of art crimes, as well as specific art crimes that have
been committed. Overall, Conklin's numerous anecdotes and in-
sights into the art world make Art Crime an enjoyable book that is sure
to educate all but the most knowledgeable members of that mysteri-
ous world.
Unfortunately, the depth of analysis in Conklin's book is inher-
ently limited by the paucity of research on this subject. This lack of
research forces the author to rely on news articles and other reports
about particular art crimes in lieu of studies about the subject as a
whole.7 The result is a compendium of anecdotes regarding behavior
in the art world and types of art crimes. Professor Conklin concedes
that he has not prepared a cohesive theory of art crime, in part due to
lack of available data and in part due to the variety of art crimes.8
However, he hopes that drawing attention to the scope and types of
art crime will stimulate further research.9
The weaknesses of this book are its lack of statistical information,
which precludes a meaningful understanding of art crime as a whole
(and of particular types of art crime); and the superficial treatment of
the applicable legal standards, which leaves the reader with a sense of
hopelessness as to what can be done to combat the sociological forces
causing the proliferation of art crimes. In fact, many of Conklin's sug-
gestions for curbing art crime seem unrealistically naive after reading
the rest of the book. The first weakness is not the fault of the author,
given the lack of information available in this area of inquiry. 10 In
fact, he frequently notes the need for additional data and study in this
area and acknowledges the difficulties presented by a lack of meaning-
7 Several notable exceptions relied upon by Professor Conklin include BONNIE BURN-
HAM, THE ART CRisIs (1975); DARio GAMBONI, UN ICONOCLASME MODERNE: THtORIE ET PRA-
TIQUES CONTEMPORAINES DU VANDAiUSM ARrISTIQUE (Zfirich, Institut Suisse Pour L'Etude
de L'Art; and Lausanne, Les Editions D'En-Bas 1988); Gary Allen Fine, CheatingHisttory: The
Rhetoris fArt Forgery, EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE ARTS I 75-93 (1983); and Gary Allen Fine
and Debra Shatin, Crimes Against Art: Social Meanings and Symbolic Attacks, EMPIRICAL STUDIES
OF THE ARTS M 135-52 (1985).
8 CoNKIN, supra note 1, at ix. Unfortunately, when Conklin is discussing these ethi-
cally questionable actions, he rarely opines as to the desirability of criminalizing them.
9 Id. at 2.
10 Id. at 3-7. Unfortunately, even though this book calls attention to the need for more
study of art crime, data will remain difficult to obtain due to the difficulties in dealing with
multiple jurisdictions' different approaches to what constitutes art, crime against art, and
methods for keeping statistics on art crime. Another barrier to obtaining reliable data is a
reluctance by collectors, museums, and others to report art crimes out of fear of exposing
the vulnerability of their collections, fear of being perceived as fools (for purchasing a
forgery) and fear of scaring away potential donors (if an art museum's collection appears
overly vulnerable). Id. at 3-4, 261.
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ful statistics." The second weakness may be nothing more than the
author's choice as to what the book should focus on, but various legal
scholars have addressed the flaws in current laws pertaining to art
crime and have suggested ways in which these laws can be improved. 12
If Conklin had chosen to examine these laws more closely, he might
have found not only better potential solutions for curbing art crime
but also a better understanding of the sociological structure of art
crime. A final problem with Art Crime is that Conklin, as a sociologist,
tends to focus on organizational structures, which, when coupled with
the lack of data in this area, leads to a simplistic, common sense treat-
ment of certain subject matters, such as how thieves steal art.13
Conklin begins with a discussion of how art obtains value. Next,
he covers various types of art crime and then discusses art vandalism.
In the final chapter, he recommends ways to reduce art crime. With
limited exceptions, the book is an exhaustive collection of anecdotes
describing various art crimes, from the theft of several Dutch Masters
paintings from Amherst College 14 to illicit trade in Zuni war god stat-
ues. 15 Current laws and international conventions affecting trade in
art and art crime are handled in a cursory manner. Although Conklin
points out that there are few convictions, sentences are light and some
countries make "laundering" stolen artwork relatively easy, 16 he rarely
looks at the laws at a level of detail that would permit one to evaluate
where such laws could be improved. When he refers to the legal treat-
ment applied to a dispute, he tends to focus on the outcome of the
case, rather than the legal standard being applied. Conklin prefers to
discuss the general behavior one encounters in both the legitimate
and illegitimate art world. 17
11 Id. at 6 (suggesting that data should be collected on art crimes instead ofjust on art
works).
12 See generally Borodkin, supra note 1; Robin M. Collin, The Law And Stolen Art, Artifacts
and Antiquities, 36 How. L.J. 17 (1993); Eisen, supra note 2; Claudia Fox, The UNIDROIT
Convention On Stolen Or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer To The World Problem of
Illicit Trade In Cultural Property, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 225 (1993); Lenzner, supra note
1; Teresa McGuire, InternationalDimensions, 11 CARDozo AaRTS & ENr. L.J. 59 (1993); Victo-
ria J. Vitrano, Protecting Cultural Objects In An Internal Border-free European Community: The
European Community Directive And Regulation For The Protection And Return Of Cultural Objects,
17 FORDHAm INT'L LJ. 1164 (1994); Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen Artwork: Deciding
Ownership Is No Pretty Picture, 43 DuKE L.J. 337 (1993).
13 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 153-85 (describing robbery, burglary, larceny, looting,
casing the site, use of insiders).
14 Id. at 185.
15 Id. at 201.
16 See, e.g., id. at 128-29, 161, 202, 205.
17 Given that Conklin is a sociologist, his tendency to focus on behavioral tendencies is
not surprising. However, even when describing various types of behavior in the art world
(both legal and illegal), including possible motives for such behavior and arguments for
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II. Ti VALUE OF ART
In Chapter One, Conklin explains how art obtains value. Accord-
ing to Conklin, art has both economic and cultural value.
As proof that art has cultural value, Conklin uses the example of
an icon of St. Irene stolen from a Greek Orthodox church in Queens,
NewYork, in 1991. The parishioners were overwhelmed by the return
of the stolen icon, even though it had been stripped of its gold, silver,
and jewels valued at over $800,000.18 Thus, the congregation attrib-
uted a cultural or spiritual value to the work of art independent of the
economic value of the adornments previously attached to it.19
In addressing the issue of economic value, Conklin argues that
the value of art depends more on a "shared belief in value rather than
on the law of supply and demand."20 Although economists may dis-
pute this claim (because a change in the shared belief in value could
be seen as a change in demand), it is clear that a significant increase
or decrease in public confidence in the value of art can dramatically
affect prices. As a result, auction houses, dealers, and others involved
in the art world have developed strategies to maintain public confi-
dence in the value of art, and thereby the prices of art.2 '
Conklin lists a number of factors that affect the economic value
of art. These include the artist that produced the piece, col-
lectability, 22 freedom of enjoyment,23 the perception of art as a good
and against prohibiting such behavior, Conklin frequently avoids taking a position regard-
ing whether such behavior should be legal. See, e.g., id. at 102-106, 128.
18 Id. at 16.
19 However, this example may be flawed in light of the recent debate surrounding the
actual value of such adornments and whether the priests in charge of the church were
engaged in a scheme to defraud an insurance company by overstating the value of adorn-
ments (many of which may have been worthless). See Fred R. Bleakley, Questions of Belief
Arise Once Again Over "Weeping Icon", WAU ST.J.,July 15, 1994, at Al. In spite of the contro-
versy surrounding this particular example, there can be little doubt that art has cultural as
well as economic value.
20 CoNKIN, supra note 1, at 16.
21 Id. Interestingly, Burnham has argued that, unlike classic supply and demand analy-
sis, an increase in the supply of quality art can actually raise prices (through increased
publicity that thereby increases demand). BuRNsAm, supra note 7, at 208. However, Conk-
lin points out that a decreased supply of quality art can also raise prices by creating pres-
sure for increased bidding on the quality pieces available.
22 People collect art not only for investment purposes, CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 26, but
also because it is enjoyed as an end in itself and because of the thrill in making acquisi-
tions. Id. at 21. "The act of building a collection legitimates acquisitiveness by giving it a
noble purpose..." Id. at 22. Collectors enjoy completing a gestalt. Id. "Art collectors see
their possessions as extensions of themselves, as a way to measure and present themselves
to the world." Id. However, if this analysis is correct, to the degree art reflects one's good
taste and aesthetic insight, a fake or forgery might serve the same function as an original
(but would not have the ego-enhancing attribute of allowing the owner to say he or she has
an original). However, once a piece of art is found to be a fake or a forgery, it becomes
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investment, and the distribution network.
Perhaps the most interesting of these factors is the artists them-
selves. During the Renaissance, people began to perceive artists as
"creative geniuses," and as a result, the public started giving artists
individual recognition.2 4 This belief, that great artists are particularly
gifted, has led to people judging art more by who produced it than by
its intrinsic aesthetic quality.2 5 This premise is evidenced by the
change in value of a work of art that has been reattributed to a lesser
or greater artist.2 6 Obviously, this is in part due to art's function as a
potential investment vehicle and people's perception that art created
by a well known artist will maintain a higher value.
Conklin notes that because of the potential change in value that
can occur after a reattribution, there can be significant pressure on
historians and critics "not to reattribute works to" lesser known artists
and that "museums have occassionally rejected or ignored reattribu-
tions by even highly esteemed scholars."2 7 Conklin, however, does not
indicate the frequency of such occurrences, nor does he examine
whether the failure to reattribute or to recognize a reattribution has
any criminal implications. On the one hand, failure to reattribute a
work or rejecting a reattribution based on such pressures would ap-
pear to be a fraud on potential buyers or the viewing public. In the
context of a sale, significant damage can easily be shown (the poten-
virtually worthless. MEa at 49. Thus, it appears that when art collectors are presenting them-
selves through their art, they are frequently doing more than just demonstrating a discern-
ing eye: they are revelling in the fact that they own something rare and precious, regardless
of its aesthetic merit. See also Kelly, supra note 2, at 34, 50.
23 Conklin notes that some people collect art so they can enjoy it without some of the
impediments present in museums, and as a form of conspicuous consumption allowing the
merchant class to obtain the trappings of wealth. CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 23-24. Conklin
downplays the significance of the latter idea by stating that although auction sales receive
considerable publicity, most art is sold privately and many buyers try to avoid publicity due
to a fear of potential thefts (therefore, he contends for most collectors consumption is not
conspicuous). Id. at 24. However, Conklin is not very persuasive in his argument. Even
private unpublicized acquisitions are almost always conspicuous in a limited sense because
the works of art are displayed in the collector's home or office. The circle of people the
collector most desires to impress, his or her colleagues and social acquiantances, are there-
fore made aware of such consumption.
24 CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 18.
25 Id. at 17.
26 Id. at 18-19. A number of factors affect the reputation of a particular artist: whether
the artist produced a critical mass of work; the total output of the artist; whether survivors
of the artist are hoping to perpetuate his or her reputation; whether the artist is linked to a
particular school, period or style; and whether the artist was connected to any historical or
other controversies. Id. at 20-21 (citing GLADvs ENGEL LANG AND KURT LANG, ETCHED IN
MEMORY- THE BUILDING AND SURVIVAL OF ARTISTIC REPUTATION Xii (1990)). However, some
artists never become famous simply because they do not play the game. SeeJOHN B. MvRms,
TRACKING THE MARVELOUS: A LIFE IN THE NEW YORK ART WORLD 157 (1983).
27 CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 20.
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tial change in price), and the buyer is almost certainly relying to some
degree on the attribution (as opposed to the piece's aesthetic quali-
ties) in buying any old, extremely expensive work of art. However,
given the inherent uncertainty involved with the attribution process, 28
"fraud" by a party choosing not to reattribute would be nearly impossi-
ble to prove.
One could also argue that the buyer at some level knows or
should know about the uncertainties of attribution anyway. Certainly,
when museums purchase art they are fully aware of such risks. With
regard to museums or auction houses ignoring reattributions by
noted scholars, one can argue that the museum should be required to
disclose any such controversy. The problem, of course, is when a con-
troversy arises-does it occur when one crackpot announces a reattri-
bution or does a controversy concerning reattribution require a
consensus among a group of scholars?
Also of interest is that people buy art based on the general per-
ception that art is a good investment.29 However, a number of studies
have shown that this is not the case. 30 In fact, most art has no real
resale value. However, the fact that people perceive art as a good in-
vestment attracts more people (and money) to the world of art.3 ' Not
surprisingly, museums add value to works of art by legitimating the
artists and enhancing their reputation.3 2 Additionally, museums have
historically competed for some of the best pieces, thereby driving up
prices in the market as a whole.33
Less obvious (and more questionable) is how the distributional
network affects economic value. Participants are art dealers, auction
houses, and scholars/critics. Dealers try to educate their potential
customers to increase awareness about art and the desire to buy it.3a
Additionally, scarcity helps increase value, so some dealers try to re-
strict the output of artists whose works they display.3 5 Dealers also
face the challenge of pricing art high enough so that it appears desira-
ble, but not so high as to be out of reach to the potential consumer.3 6
Conklin discusses a common practice of dealers of giving discounts to
prominent collectors.3 7 Although at first glance this appears no dif-
28 Id. at 63.
29 Id. at 32; see also Kelly, supra note 2, at 50.
30 CoNmKN, supra note 1, at 31-32.
31 Id. at 32.
32 Id. at 33.
33 Id. at 34.
34 Id. at 36.
35 Id. at 37-38.
36 Id. at 38.
37 Id.
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ferent from procedures employed by merchants in other lines of busi-
ness, having a prominent collector own a particular artist's work can
enhance the value of that artist's work in general. Thus, by encourag-
ing a renowned collector to purchase, at a discount, a piece of work by
a particular artist, the dealer increases the value of the artist's other
pieces the dealer is trying to sell.38
Conklin does not address the ethics of such dealer discounting,
but he does mention that some commentators have argued that art
should be regulated in much the same way securities are regulated in
the United States.3 9 The first problem with this idea is that it invades
the privacy of the well known collector. Most people would not want
the gallery from which they bought a work of art from to discuss with
complete strangers what they paid, especially considering the pride of
ownership usually associated with art collecting.40 The same goal, of
protecting the future buyers from "overpaying," could just as easily be
met by prohibiting galleries from disclosing to prospective purchasers
who has already bought pieces by a particular artist. This rule would
serve the additional goal of combatting the artificial price inflation
current disclosure practices create and would protect the privacy of
well-known collectors. Obviously, such an approach will not prevent
prospective purchasers from learning about ownership of an artist's
work by particularly high profile people (those who are hanging their
works in museums or being written about by gossip columnists). How-
ever, how would a price discount on acquisitions by such people be
disseminated? It is hard to imagine a regime forcing such benefactors
of the arts to disclose the purchase price of a painting on the wall of
the museum where it is hanging.
Auction houses possibly have been the most visible contributors
to the perception of art as a valuable investment. Newspaper articles
touting record sales prices for works of art and describing people who
have become rich selling items found in attics have called considera-
ble attention to the potential value of art.4' Auction houses have also
given legitimacy to collecting objects previously thought of as uncol-
lectible.42 Auction houses have engaged in a number of promotional
strategies to help increase the value of art. One of these strategies is
to establish an affiliated publishing house that publishes monographs
38 Id.
39 I.e., the fact that a painting was sold at a discount to a known collector should, argua-
bly, be disclosed to other potential "investors." Id. at 270.
40 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
41 CONKLUN, supra note 1, at 39.
42 Id. at 40.
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to attract attention to the types of works the auction house sells. 43
While not all people will view these activities as unethical, many
people would consider a number of the activities in which auction
houses engage as, at the least, questionable. For example, in a
$53.9 million sale of Van Gogh's Irises, Sotheby's, a respected auction
house, agreed, prior to the sale, to lend one bidder "half of whatever
he bid" for the painting, using the work of art as collateral for the
loan.44 Auction houses also use price guarantees and set secret
reserves below which they will not sell the object.45 Although a secret
reserve may not itself be objectionable, the fact that auction houses
frequently pretend that they have sold paintings to fictitious bidders
when the secret reserve has not been met can be seen as a method of
creating the impression that art is selling for more than people are
actually willing to pay for it. This artificial price inflation helps reen-
force the perception that art is both valuable and a good investment.
Additionally, it can be characterized, potentially, as a form of fraud.46
There seems to be no legitimate reason for an auction house to not
openly disclose that a painting was not sold because its reserve was not
met
Probably the most troubling issues raised by Conklin in this chap-
ter are the practices of some scholars, who affect value by performing
scholarship on works of art and by attributing works to particular art-
ists. One such undertaking is to perform scholarship on lesser known
artists with the financial backing of a dealer. The dealer provides such
backing since the artist's work becomes more valuable based on the
research and publications about the artist.47 Even worse, dealers and
artists have at times given works to critics. The artist is subsequently
praised by the critic, thereby increasing the value of the artist's work
and concurrently the value of piece given to the critic. Although
Conklin discusses these activities, he does not suggest whether these
activities should be outlawed or, at least, disclosed.
To prohibit gifts from artists or dealers to critics, persons that
presumably have a love of art, seems unduly harsh and hard to justify
legally. The illegitimate price escalation can be prevented simply by
requiring the critic to disclose any such gifts in his or her review of a
particular artist. Given a critic's ability to influence that value of any
work he or she owns (regardless of how it was acquired), it seems pru-
dent to require similar disclosure by a critic in any review of an artist
43 Id. at 42.
44 Id. at 41.
45 Id. at 42-43.
46 See infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
47 CONxI., supra note 1, at 44.
19961
JOHN A BARRE=T, JR.
when the critic owns one of the artist's pieces. Furthermore, if it ap-
pears, upon further inquiry, that critics rave about artists at a gallery
from which the critic receives free or discounted works, even though
the critic does not own any art by the artist being reviewed, such pecu-
niary ties should also be disclosed.
III. FAKEs AND FORGERIES
The sale of counterfeit art generates tens of millions of dollars a
year,48 and makes the public wary of buying art. Thomas Hoving of
New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art stated he believes that 60%
of the art he has seen has been faked or forged.49 Fakes are reproduc-
tions made to resemble existing works of art, and forgeries are origi-
nal pieces someone attributes to another artist.50
Although the anecdotes in this chapter are quite interesting, the
crimes of faking and forging works of art are relatively self-explana-
tory, and there is little to say about these crimes. Of more interest is a
discussion of the differences certain cultures have placed on the value
of originality. 51
Also of interest is the fact that a fake or forgery has little eco-
nomic value once discovered, even if it has tremendous aesthetic
value, because of the deceit attached to it52 As noted, the reattribu-
tion of a work of art to a different artist can dramatically affect its
value,53 but not nearly as much as the discovery that the work is a
forgery.5 4 Conklin argues that the difference in the price change
caused by a reattribution, as opposed to the discovery of a fake or a
forgery, is due to the fact that there is no intent to deceive attached to
the work that has been reattributed. 55 However, it appears the more
important issue may in fact be that reattributed works (which are gen-
erally older pieces where the full body of work of a particular artist is
not accurately known) will still have value because of age, attribution
to another well known artist (or a school), and other factors that usu-
ally give value to works of art that endure the test of time. In fact,
given the past practice of artists signing works of art prepared by their
students, 56 one could argue an intent to deceive may have originally
48 Id. at 47.
49 Thomas Hoving, My Eye: The Forgery Boom, CONNOISSEUR, Nov. 1986, at 41.
50 CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 48.
51 Id. For example, in Egypt and certain parts of the Orient, copying has historically
been a sign of respect.
52 Id. at 49.
53 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
54 CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 49.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 55.
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been present in certain "well-aged" works of art (although such behav-
ior would not have been perceived as inappropriate at the time).
However, such deceit does not taint the value of these pictures.
With regard to discovering forgeries, various scientific methods
such as x-rays and chemical tests can prove that a work of art is not
what someone claims it is; such tests, however, cannot definitively
prove that the work is legitimate. 57 Therefore, connoisseurship and
scholarship remain essential to uncovering forgeries, and to the attri-
bution process.58 Yet, since scientific tests can detect many forgeries,
forgers have learned that it is frequently better to copy less valuable
pieces where such tests are less likely to be employed.5 9
Conklin devotes considerable time to the social organization of
faking and forging but recognizes that "[p]irofit is the primary motive
of forgers and the dealers who sell their works."60 Of greater interest,
however, are the methods used to help create a provenance for a
forged or fake work of art. Methods include: creating false sales in-
voices; creating or stealing gallery labels; stealing other supporting
documents; auctioning the work in an out-of-the-way auction house so
that a legitimate bill of sale is attached to it; and, with regard to antiq-
uities, "discovering" a site after the site has been previously seeded
with works of art.61
Surprisingly, some experts who have detected counterfeit works
have decided not to disclose that knowledge out of a concern that, by
betraying how they can detect whether a work is counterfeit, forgers
might learn ways to avoid such mistakes in future endeavors. 62 How-
ever, Conklin questions whether this behavior truly serves the art com-
munity. By not disclosing that a work is counterfeit out of a fear
forgers may improve their techniques, such experts win the battle but
lose the war. Failure to disclose renders moot the need for superior
techniques, since forgeries will continue to be passed off as originals.
It seems preferable to denounce forgeries whenever possible even
though in the future new methods may be needed to uncover
counterfeits.
Restoration also raises significant issues with regard to the origi-
nality of a work of art because restorers must change the work from
what it currently is and almost certainly cannot make it exactly what it
57 Id. at 63.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 64.
60 Id. at 65.
61 Id. at 76-78.
62 Id. at 83.
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originally was.63 Although Conklin does not attempt to define when a
restored work of art ceases to be an original, the controversy is a
thought-provoking one that leads to a second, largely unexplored
question of whether it is preferable to let art works deteriorate over
time (even under the best of conditions) or to restore them so that
future generations may enjoy their original appearance (or a close
approximation). In terms of appreciating the aesthetics of a work of
art, it is possible to argue that a significantly deteriorated 500-year-old
work of art is further removed from the work of art in its original
condition than a restored piece (or even an excellent fake). Once
again, the true issue with regard to the "originality" of restorations
seems to be economics, not aesthetics. An unrestored, deteriorated
work of art may be aesthetically less pleasing (and farther removed
from the original state of the work) but more economically valuable
than the restored piece. In terms of aesthetics, once a piece has dete-
riorated significantly, there is little reason not to restore it as closely as
possible to its original condition.
One of the final issues addressed in this chapter is the growth of
legitimate companies producing extremely convincing fake works of
art, which are identified as such.64 Although these companies are dis-
cussed due to a concern that they may innocently add to the passing
of fakes as originals in the art world, it shows that there is a market for
art based on its aesthetic value.65 To eliminate this type of art is to
prevent all but the wealthiest from enjoying the aesthetics of great
works of art, except in museums. This seems unduly restrictive since
the only time a problem should arise is when an unscrupulous dealer
tries to pass off such a fake as an original or someone tries to sell a
fake or forgery to a dealer. The first problem can be addressed more
directly through regulating dealers. The second problem can be ad-
dressed through the use of art registers that allow dealers to check to
see if a work has been attributed to a particular artist, thereby making
it hard to sell a forgery.66 A dealer purchasing a fake is less of a con-
cern since the dealer should know or be able to discover that the ven-
dor is not the legitimate owner of a given well known work of art.
Similarly, forged antiquities could be dealt with through the use of
registers listing what has been discovered. Even without such informa-
tion, dealers are acting questionably, and should be on notice, if they
63 Id. at 57.
64 Id. at 84.
65 The author recognizes that even excellent fakes do not have the same aesthetic value
as original works of art.
66 See infra notes 149-152.
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are buying antiquities without the proper export permits. 67
IV. FRAUD
To an even greater degree than the chapter on fakes and forger-
ies, the chapter on fraud is tied together by a laundry list of different
incidents of fraud that have occurred in the art world. Most of the
types of fraud Conklin discusses either occur outside the art world as
well or are quite well known: owners of art writing bad checks to deal-
ers; owners inflating the value of art in insurance claims for stolen art,
for tax deductions, or for use as collateral in a loan; dealers underpay-
ing artists; dealers engaging in consignment fraud; and dealers mis-
representing their merchandise to potential purchasers.68 However,
Conklin also discusses less obvious forms of fraud, including: the use
of art to launder money and to avoid paying income tax;69 dealers
acting in concert to keep bids down when buying at auctions;70 and
scholars assisting in the sale of a work of art to a museum where the
scholar has an undisclosed financial interest in the sale.71
The most interesting part of this chapter is the detailed descrip-
tion of auction house practices that appear to be legitimate but may in
fact be "deceptive and even border on fraudulent."72 However, crimi-
nal courts rarely deal with these activities. 78 To increase interest in a
work of art up for auction, auctioneers will "accept" bids from ficti-
tious bidders.74 Also, many works of art are subject to a secret reserve,
and auction houses will frequently say a fictitious buyer bought a work
of art that did not meet its reserve.75 In 1986, New York passed a law
requiring auction houses to mark any objects subject to a secret re-
serve, and auction houses began marking every item in the catalogue
so that potential bidders gained no additional information.76 Conklin
presents two arguments auction houses make for engaging in such
practices: trying to avoid having a stigma attach to a work of art that
does not reach its reserve; and preventing dealers from acting in a
collusive manner to keep sales prices low.77
67 See infra note 123.
68 CoNKrN, supra note 1, at 87-97.
69 Id. at 91.
70 Id. at 96.
71 Id. at 99-100. Since these activities constitute criminal behavior, no discussion is un-
dertaken with regard to their desirability.
72 Id. at 101.
73 Id.
74 CoNKLiN, supra note 1, at 102-03.
75 Id. at 103.
76 Id. at 104.
77 Id. at 104-05.
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Once again, Conklin fails to take a position as to whether addi-
tional reform should be made.78 The stigma argument seems unper-
suasive: a seller has the right to set a minimum price at which he or
she is willing to sell, and disclosing that the auction price failed to
reach that level should in no way lower the work's value. The value
was already lower than the seller had hoped, and to pretend it sold for
the reserve amount is artificially inflating its perceived value for the
sole purpose of a future sale. Although fictitious buyers can help
deter dealer collusion, they also artificially raise prices. A less intru-
sive deterrent would be for auction houses to disclose the existence of
a secret reserve at the end of the bidding, rather than the beginning,
which encourages bidders to bid the true market value of the piece or
risk not getting it. The only harm that would come from waiting to
disclose secret reserves is that some bidders will not purchase a piece
even though they offered more than anyone else for it. On the one
hand, this is not problematic because the seller obviously places a
higher value on the piece than the amount bid. On the other hand,
the result is somewhat inequitable since it allows the seller to avoid the
downside risk of a low market valuation while allowing him or her to
participate in any upside valuation. However, this same inequality
would exist even if the existence of the secret reserve were announced
before bidding begins and does exist under the current practice of
using fictitious bidders.
Conklin further notes that members of boards of directors of auc-
tion houses have been known to bid on and purchase art works at
their respective auction houses. 79 Conklin raises the question
whether this should be seen as insider trading, since the board mem-
bers might have inside information on reserves or prearranged orders
for bids that give them an unfair advantage.80 Although Conklin does
not take a position on this potential problem, it becomes a problem
only when the active bidding does not exceed the reserve or the prear-
ranged bid. If active bidding exceeds these levels, the board member
must compete with the other bidders on an equal basis. Therefore,
the solution to any insider trading is either to require procedures that
prohibit a board member planning to participate in an upcoming auc-
tion from receiving such information or to prohibit board members
from buying items being auctioned unless unrelated bids exceed both
the reserve and any prearranged bids.
The most shocking section of this chapter is the anecdotes involv-
78 Id.




ing erroneous appraisals. In an incident involving an alleged Faberge
egg, the same appraiser made several appraisals regarding the origi-
nality of the egg and reached opposite conclusions depending on
which side of the transaction the auction house he worked for was
on.8' Although one would be hard-pressed to describe such action as
fraudulent, assuming the appraiser acted in good faith and merely
changed his mind, one must question whether an auction house
should be required to warrant its appraisals or to use an independent
third party in obtaining appraisals. Independent appraisals provide
the minimal protection of removing the bias that an in-house person
might have if he or she knows which side of the transaction the auc-
tion house is on, but they would not prevent auction houses from
choosing different appraisers (with appropriate predispositions) de-
pending on which side of the transaction the auction house is on.
Obviously, warranting an appraisal of authenticity provides signifi-
cantly more protection to the purchaser, but it creates significant lia-
bility exposure for the auction house for future reattributions, even if
the auction house has undertaken due diligence.8 2 Given the poten-
tial exposure such a regime would create, and given the fact that reap-
praisals are an inherent risk for collectors of certain pieces of art, such
a requirement seems hard to justify because of both its cost and the
overprotection it provides to purchasers; especially since the less bur-
densome concept of requiring an independent appraisal would
largely serve the same purpose of removing auction house bias.83
Unfortunately, fraud convictions are uncommon. This is partially
because they- are hard to prove, but also because, when faced with a
strong potential case against an auction house, museum, or dealer,
the parties generally prefer to settle out of court.8 4
81 CoNKLrN, supra note 1, at 107-08.
82 See generally Borodkin, supra note 1, at 386.
83 Similarly, there often appears to be no general duty on the part of auction houses to
check the provenances of the works of art they sell. See CoNmIN, supra note 1, at 110;
Collin, supra note 12, at 19. A faulty provenance can affect both attribution and title to the
work. To what degree should auction houses have to check the provenances of the works
of art they sell? The auction houses claim extensive checks are unduly burdensome given
the volume of items sold. However, since auction houses are frequently used by forgers,
counterfeiters and thieves to create a false provenance, requiring an adequate investigation
could help deter a number of art crimes. CoxKLIN, supra note 1, at 269. Alternatively,
auction houses could be required to warrant title (which is the case in the United States
but not in Europe). Id. at 111. Use of warranties provides the greatest protection to pur-
chasers, gives the auction house the maximum incentive to be careful, and makes re-
turning stolen art to its rightful owner easier, since its purchaser will be compensated for
the return of the piece. Obviously, the potential liability is significant, and will therefore
be heavily resisted by auction houses.
84 CoNux , supra note 1, at 116-17.
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V. ART THEFT OPPORTUNITIES AND MOTIVES
As previously noted, art theft is estimated to total $1 billion per
year.8 5 However, estimates reveal "that only 10% of all stolen art is
recovered" (although up to 50% of well-known pieces may be recov-
ered since their disappearance tends to be more publicized and they
are therefore harder to dispose of).86 Of this amount, approximately
10% is stolen from private owners such as museums, churches and
galleries. Most theft is in the form of looting ancient sites. The analy-
sis in this chapter is relatively straightforward, with Conklin discussing
the suitability of various types of targets for theft, the relative levels of
security at various places where art is housed, and the reasons why
thieves are motivated to steal.8 7
Most thefts of art in the United States are from galleries or indi-
vidual owners, whereas most thefts elsewhere in the world are from
individual owners or churches.88 Conklin recognizes there may be as
much gallery theft abroad, in terms of total volume, as in the United
States. However, as a relative percentage, gallerly theft is lower abroad
given the high number of thefts from churches.8 9 Not surprisingly,
museums have lower theft rates worldwide than other locations be-
cause of better security, including guards. 90
An interesting point made by Conklin concerns the prohibition
on the sale of religious artifacts in most countries. Given the demand
for these artifacts, he suggests that allowing the sale of lesser items
may both help financially strapped churches and help satisfy de-
mand.91 However, the question remains whether permitting such
sales would increase the overall demand by attracting new purchasers
to the market that had previously shied away due to the illegality of
obtaining such objects.
Antiquities are perceived as a particularly suitable target for theft
because: it is difficult to determine who owns the pieces;92 conflicting
85 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
86 CONKUN, supra note 1, at 129.
87 Id. at 119, 123, 128.
88 Id. at 121.
89 Id. In other words, the dollar value of gallery theft in the United States and abroad
may be about the same, but since there is very little church theft in the United States and a
large volume of church theft abroad, gallery thefts constitute a lower percentage of all
thefts abroad than in the United States. Thefts from churches are the least common type
of art theft in the United States, which is not surprising since U.S. churches generally have
far fewer significant works of art on display than their European counterparts. Id. at 121.
90 Id. at 121-22.
91 Id. at 128. For a similar argument concerning the sale of antiquities, see Borodkin,
supra note 1, at 411.
92 Several different countries can produce substantially similar artifacts, making it un-
clear where an artifact came from.
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legal systems are frequently involved;93 and there is no way to catalog
all the pieces in existence. 94 In fact, it has been estimated that illicit
trade in ancient artifacts may support one percent of Turkey's total
work force.95 The enforcement of laws prohibiting trade in antiqui-
ties is further complicated by the fact that many museums oppose re-
patriation of ancient pieces, given that many of their collections could
be seriously depleted by such a practice.96
Considering the unique nature of most art, a major problem aris-
ing with regard to art theft is that many people would prefer to re-
cover the art than to bring charges against thieves.97 In addition, art
criminals traditionally receive incredibly light sentences, and, occa-
sionally even immunity has been granted for returning an important
work of art.98 When light sentences are coupled with the perceived
high value of art, it is easy to see how thieves are motivated to steal
art.99
However, most stolen art is resold for only 10 to 20 percent of its
true market value, 0 0 which may mean that thieves are more likely to
engage in art crime if they have the necessary connections to liquidate
the art they steal effectively.' 10
VI. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF ART THEFT
The chapter on the social organization of art theft, like the prior
93 The laws of countries that customarily import antiquities often ignore the concerns
of looted countries.
94 See CONKIN, supra note 1, at 122. See also Borodkin, supra note 1; Fox, supra note 12;
Kelly, supra note 2, at 47-48; Lenzner, sup a note 1; McGuire, supra note 12.
95 See BuRNHAM, supra note 7, at 113.
96 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 134; but see Kelly, supra note 2 (indicating a growing
trend among museums to cooperate with repatriation efforts and the increasing success of
antiquities exporting nations in reobtaining such objects).
97 See CONKLiN, supra note 1, at 129.
98 See id. at 148, 156, 183, 200, 214.
99 See Fox, supra note 12, at 226.
100 See CoNKLN, supra note 1, at 142.
101 Thefts of art can be for personal possession, on commission for an interested buyer
(for a particular piece of art), for consignment to an auction house, or on speculation that
the thief will be able to resell the art. Id. at 130-43; see also Kelly, supra note 2, at 51.
Additionally, art is sometimes taken for ransom since many insurance companies will pay
up to 10 percent of the insured value of the art for its safe return. CoNKLiN, supra note 1,
at 144. Unfortunately, paying ransoms for art increases its liquidity and therefore makes it
a more attractive target to steal. Id at 145. However, the exchange of the object for the
ransom money can be difficult to arrange. Id. at 146. Finally, some thieves are not moti-
vated by personal profit but rather by political purposes. Id. at 149. This final category is
related to several types of terrorism, where the thief demands political prisoners be re-
leased in exchange for a work of art that is culturally important to the society. Unfortu-
nately, Conklin provides no breakdown as to the relative frequency of the various reasons
for theft.
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chapter on opportunities and motives for art theft, continues with a
relatively common sense description of many of the types of art thefts
that occur: larceny, burglary and robbery.10 2 It also discusses the use
of insiders to gain information and thefts by employees and acquaint-
ances of the art owner.'03 Stolen art is then "laundered" by creating a
provenance for the art with stolen certificates, forged bills of sales,
exhibitions in museums or purchases by the thief/owner at an
auction. 104
Conklin notes that it appears organized crime is heavily involved
in art theft as a way to make a profit, to launder drug money and to
enhance social status (as the owners of important works of art). 0 5 Ad-
ditionally, compared to the risks in drug trafficking, the poor security
and light sentences connected with art crime make engaging in such
activities a low risk endeavor for persons already involved with organ-
ized crime.'0 6
VII. DISTRIBUTION OF STOLEN ART
Given that only 10 to 12 percent of stolen art is recovered, how
stolen art is distributed is largely a matter of speculation.' 0 7 Obvi-
ously, some stolen art will still be with thieves, some makes its way to
collectors, and some has been recovered or returned via payment of a
ransom.
108
Unfortunately, the illegitimate art market is tightly intertwined
with the legitimate art market, making it all the harder to stop. 0 9
This interconnection poses nearly intractable difficulties for trying to
stem the flow of art crime, since few art dealers appear to be above
reproach. Conklin highlights Burnham's suggestion that most art
dealers do not tell everything they know to law enforcement agencies
because even the most legitimate of dealers do not always investigate
the provenances of the works of art they sell as thoroughly as
possible." 0
The general attitude of most U.S. museum curators is that they
have no option but to deal in illicit antiquities if they wish to build
their collections at all."' One museum curator went so far as to say
102 Id. at 154-58.
103 Id at 168-77.
104 Id. at 181.
105 Id. at 182, 184.
106 Id. at 183.
107 IM. at 187.
108 Id.
109 See BuRNHAM, supra note 7, at 37.
110 See CONLIN, supra note 1, at 195.
"11 Id. at 191-93.
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that if U.S. museums began sending all their illicit material back to
the countries from which such antiquities came, U.S. museums would
be empty. 12 In spite of the occasional controversy surrounding an
acquisition, the view of many curators is that such controversies will
fade but "a museum's collection will endure.""u 3 Since museums are
major purchasers of antiquities, their lax attitude regarding the legal-
ity of what they purchase creates a significant incentive for continued
looting." 4 However, many museums will continue in this manner un-
less faced with the prospect of losing antiquities for which they have
spent substantial sums. 15
Conklin does a cursoryjob of describing the relevant legal norms
applicable to stolen or looted art. Without an understanding of the
problems presented by each of these norms, one cannot formulate
suggestions as to how the legal system can be improved to help deter
art crime. Generally, most of the applicable laws of a given country
will apply equally to both looted artifacts and stolen fine art, although
there are some additional laws for dealing with looted antiquities."16
However, each type of stolen art presents different factual difficulties
for legal systems to deal with. In the United States, several somewhat
contradictory principles affect title to stolen artwork."17 Although the
112 SeeJoHN L. HESS, THE GRANTiNG Acouisrrorts 148 (1974). The current inflexibility
of the laws of antiquity producing counties which fuels this view has led some commenta-
tors to suggest that antiquity rich countries should auction off some of their lesser pieces to
help fill the demand for artifacts and to raise money to better care for those artifacts that
remain. See Borodkin, supra note 1, at 411-14.
113 See CoNuN, supra note 1, at 191.
114 Id.
115 But see Kelly, supra note 2, at 31-32 (indicating a growing trend among museums to
attempt to acquire only legitimately exported antiquities).
116 Most antiquity producing countries claim ownership of all antiquities in their terri-
tory, but few antiquity importing countries have laws requiring imports to have been legally
excavated from their source country. See CoNKLIN, supra note 1, at 187-97; see also Kelly,
supra note 2, at 32-33. Additionally, many antiquities exporting countries are signatories to
the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the llicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership Of Cultural Property, but the only art importing coun-
tries to sign are the United States and Canada, subject to certain qualifications. See CONK-
UN, supra note 1, at 280; Borodkin, supra note 1; Fox, supra note 12; Kelly, supra note 2, at
44-45; Lenzner, supra note 1; McGuire, supra note 12. For discussion of the UNIDROIT
Convention on Stolen or-Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, a more recent international
agreement attempting to fill the gaps in the UNESCO Convention, see generally, Fox,
supra note 12; Lenzner, supra note 1. For a discussion of recent European Community
directives on the transnational shipment of cultural objects, see generally Vitrano, supra
note 12, at 1164.
117 First, a thief cannot pass good title to a stolen item, even to a good faith purchaser.
Second, the original owner of a stolen item may proceed against a good faith purchaser on
an action in replevin for return of the item without compensation to the purchaser. Origi-
nally, replevin actions had to be brought within a statute of limitations that began running
when the theft occurred. The theory behind this rule was that it would encourage the
original owner to act diligently to recover his or her chattels and the rule would promote
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trend in common law countries has been to protect the interests of
the original owner, each of the approaches has been criticized for
placing a disproportionate burden on the good faith purchaser that
stands to lose the money spent on the work of art if the item has to be
returned. In contrast, most civil law countries protect a good faith
purchaser, which is often seen as unfair to the original owner and as
encouraging art theft.1 8 The civil law protection of good faith pur-
chasers not only encourages theft, but also allows stolen art to be laun-
dered by creating good title for a stolen object in a civil law country
before bringing it into a common law country." 9 Thus the primary
difficulty in dealing with stolen fine art is in reconciling the civil and
common law approaches in a way that is perceived as fair to partici-
pants in both systems.
The illicit trade in antiquities faces additional problems. Many
nations that import antiquities do not have laws prohibiting the im-
portation of objects illicitly exported from other countries, 20 which
stability and predictability over time. However, courts became aware of the fact that when
artworks are stolen, the original owner frequently does not find out where they went until
well after the statute of limitations has run. This seemed unfair to the original owners, so
the courts developed several mechanisms for dealing with the long potential delays that
can occur with stolen artwork. Some courts applied an adverse possession standard. Open
and notorious possession of the item would vest tide in the good faith purchaser after the
appropriate period of time. An advantage of this approach is that it focuses on the behav-
ior of the purchaser. However, this approach favors the original owner since the purchaser
must prove each of the elements of adverse possession, and establishing open and notori-
ous possession is difficult to do for a piece of art hanging in one's home. Another ap-
proach is the demand rule, which says that the statute of limitations will not begin running
until the original owner demands the return of the property. The problem with this ap-
proach is that it removes the incentive of the original owner to act promptly, and thereby
severely burdens the good faith purchaser. Additionally, actions of the purchaser, like
open and notorious possession, are largely ignored. However, the good faith purchaser
may be able to assert a defense of latches, which places a due diligence standard on the
original owner of the stolen item. A final approach is the discovery rule, which says that
the cause of action accrues when the original owner knew or should have known where the
stolen artwork is located. Although the discovery rule is the most common approach in
the United States, it is problematic because it does not have a particular standard of due
diligence to which the owner is held. Without such a standard, even open and notorious
possession by the purchaser may not suffice to run the statute of limitations, and, there-
fore, the discovery rule creates incentives for the purchaser to hide his or her acquisition.
For further discussion of these approaches, see generally Borodkin, supra note 1; Collin,
supra note 12; Eisen, supra note 2; Fox, supra note 12; Hayworth, supra note 12; Joshua E.
Kastenberg, Assessing The Evolution And Available Actions For Recovery in Cultural Property, 6
DEPAULJ OF ART & ENTERTAINMENT LAw 398 (1995); Kelly, supra note 2.
118 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 271. See also Collin, supra note 12; Eisen, supra note 2;
Fox, supra note 12; Hayworth, supra note 12.
119 CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 271-75. See also Collin, supra note 12; Eisen, supra note 2;
Fox, supra note 12; Hayworth, supra note 12.
120 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 197.
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weakens to a considerable degree the national patrimony laws12 ' of
antiquities producing countries. Additionally, it is frequently hard to
prove the source country for a particular antiquity. 122 Without know-
ing an object's country of origin, it is difficult to prove it was illegally
excavated or exported. 128 Conklin argues that requiring proof an ob-
ject was legally excavated and exported from its country of origin
could help curb the trade in illicit antiquities. 124 Although this sug-
gestion would help if implemented, the fact that not all antiquities in
the possession of collectors are catalogued means that such a require-
ment would be overbroad by reaching antiquities that were exported
prior to national patrimony laws and export license requirements.
VIII. VANrDAIISM
Unlike art theft, which can be dealt with by museums through
various security measures that do not necessarily impair the aesthetic
enjoyment of art, art vandalism forces museum curators and others
who maintain and display art collections to decide between maximiz-
ing public access to and enjoyment of art against protecting and safe-
guarding such art.'25 Conklin engages in more analysis in this chapter
than any other in the book, except the final chapter, and raises several
interesting points.
The first issue on Conklin's list is broadening the definition of
vandalism beyond intentional destruction or illegally damaging art to
include negligent damage or destruction. 26 This definition would in-
clude damage caused by pollution over time, damage by thieves in the
course of stealing or storing art, poor restoration of art and deliberate
destruction of art works by their owners. As will become clear, attach-
ing criminal penalties to some of these activities would be highly
controversial.
Conklin compares vandalism occurring in the course of an art
theft to the felony murder rule.127 He suggests a new category of
crime called "felony vandalism" for vandalism that occurs in connec-
tion with a theft of art. Felony vandalism is a form of aggravated van-
dalism which would be punished more severely than ordinary
vandalism. Although this concept makes sense within the broad defi-
121 These laws declare that antiquites belong to the state.
122 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 122. See also Borodkin, supra note 1; Fox, supra note 12;
Kelly, supra note 2, at 47-48; Lenzner, supra note 1; McGuire, supra note 12.
123 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 197.
124 Id. at 258.
125 Id at 227.
126 Id.
127 Id at 228.
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nition Conklin employs for vandalism, 28 the felony vandalism con-
cept does not work easily within the traditional definition of
vandalism. This is because unintentionally damaging a work of art is
not generally perceived of as a form of vandalism, and is, therefore,
not subject to punishment.
If the concept of vandalism is expanded, Conklin's analogy ap-
pears sensible. Just as armed robbery carries with it a significant risk
of deadly force being used, art theft frequently carries a significant
risk of serious damage occurring to the work of art being stolen.
Thus, it may be desirable to have penalties above and beyond those
for stealing works of art for the damage caused to the work in the
course of such theft. However, since presumably both the theft and
the vandalism are already punishable, having a crime of felony van-
dalism would serve no purpose unless it eliminates an existing mens
rea requirement for the vandalism charge.
More objectionable is Conklin's discussion of restoration as a po-
tential form of vandalism to art.129 Since deterioration due to pollu-
tion is also a form of vandalism, given Conklin's definition, one may
well be "damned if you do and damned if you don't." Obviously,
either one of these two actions must be removed from the scope of
vandalism or standards have to be established to determine when de-
terioration and when restoration are so extreme as to constitute van-
dalism. However, to label either of these acts as criminal vandalism is
to radically alter an owner's ability to use his or her property as he or
she sees fit.
Conklin also discusses the "vandalism" committed by certain
modem artists who have used replicas of art and modified them in
such a way that some people have seen the modified "works of art" as
degrading or demeaning. 30 Provided a replica is being modified, it
seems hard to classify such an action as vandalism both since an origi-
nal art work is not being damaged and since some will argue the mod-
ified replica is art. In a similar vein, Conklin advocates the growing
movement of giving artists the right to prevent those who own or con-
trol their works of art from altering, damaging or destroying such
works.13' However, this leads to an irresolvable conflict between dif-
ferent artists in certain instances. 132
128 So vandalism in the course of commissioning a felony is more severe than negligent
damage to a work of art by an art owner caused by poor storage conditions.
129 Id. at 229.
130 Id. at 230.
131 For example, in the United States, the 1990 Visual Artists Rights Act protects works
commissioned for display that are commissioned or completed after 1991 from mutilation,
distortion or other modification.
132 An example of such a conflict occurred when the architect who designed a plaza in
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In spite of the potential conflicts, Conklin's concern over the
rights of artists raises important issues with regard to whether owners
of art should be allowed to destroy such art.' 33 Although such de-
struction has historically been permitted, art is viewed by certain mem-
bers of the public as part of a society's joint cultural heritage, and
some would argue that the owners of art are "caretakers" of it with "no
moral right to destroy it."134 Obviously, granting such rights conflicts
with the general concept of private property ownership in the United
States. It also raises commercial ("takings") concerns if the "work of
art" could be broken up and sold for substantially more in pieces than
as a whole.135 Although Conklin does not explicitly resolve these po-
tential conflicts, he seems disposed to favor the argument against de-
struction of such items. However, how far should this analysis be
taken? If a signed and numbered print in an edition of thousands is
subjected to negligent care should the owner be liable for vandalism?
As interesting as these philosophical issues may be, they are clearly
beyond the current definition of art crime.
Finally, Conklin attempts to explain deliberate vandalism in a so-
cial. context. 3 6 Deliberate vandalism is often explained as the act of
an unbalanced personality, 37 but Conklin believes this is not always
the case. His first example, vandalism as social protest (where the van-
dalism is deliberately undertaken in furtherance of a political cause),
is a credible explanation for why someone who is not "mentally ill"
might engage in vandalism. 38 However, several of his other attempts
to distinguish vandalism from mental imbalance are not so
persuasive. 39
Manhattan (arguably an artistic act) was later "defaced" by the addition of a sculpture by
Richard Serra. Serra was unwilling to allow the sculpture to be removed and exhibited
elsewhere claiming that the piece was designed specifically for that space. However, the
architecture of the plaza had not been designed with that sculpture in mind. See CONKLIN,
supra note 1, at 237-38; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77 (2nd Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the Visual Artists Rights Act did not prevent the removal of a work of art from the
building it was commissioned for since the artwork was created while the artists were em-
ployees; thereby rendering the piece a work for hire), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996).
133 See CoNKuN, supra note 1, at 234.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 235. Examples of this are "antiquarian books that contain drawings, prints, or
maps." On the other hand, the power of modem mass marketing may have created a
situation where the combined market value of tiny fragments of a Rembrandt is worth
more than the intact painting. It seems likely many would see the fragmentation of such
an item as unacceptable, even though restricting such acts is an infringement on current
private property rights.
136 Id. at 240.
'37 Id. at 242.
138 Id. at 243-44.
139 See CONKLiN, supra note 1, at 250-51. In particular, vandalism caused by people stat-
ing that a voice told them to engage in such acts would appear to be the act of someone
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IX. CURBING ART CRIME
The final chapter of Conklin's book is probably the most analytic
and one of the few places in which Conklin advocates positions. A
number of the things he advocates are relatively commonsensical,
such as improving security for art works. 140 Conklin highlights the
frequent assertion that to decrease trade in stolen antiquities requires
encouraging additional national patrimony laws and having honest
customs agents and government officials. 14' However, these sugges-
tions do not seem to go far enough and are highly idealistic, especially
in light of the facts Conklin has already acknowledged: patrimony laws
cannot work effectively without cooperation from art importing states;
and significant bribes are paid to such people in relatively impover-
ished nations for their cooperation. 142 In my view, requiring repatria-
tion of illicitly obtained antiquities (on a prospective basis) would
provide museum curators and collectors with a strong incentive to in-
vestigate what they are purchasing. If an objective standard, like ob-
taining a certificate from the exporting country indicating the
property had been legally exported, were required, it would be very
difficult to obtain good faith purchaser status in the absence of such a
certificate. If a purchaser of illicitly obtained art is not a good faith
purchaser, the civil law protection for good faith purchasers will not
be available. Of course thieves could argue that the antiquity's arrival
predated the certificate requirement. However, this could be dealt
with by allowing voluntary registration of antiquities before the statute
goes into effect or by allowing the purported owner to prove the an-
tiquity's arrival was prior to the requirement.
Similarly, in order to qualify as a good faith purchaser of stolen
fine art, the law could mandate that one must first consult a central
registry of stolen art.143 As Conklin points out, currently there are a
number of different registries, but there is no one central registry.'4
As such, good faith sometimes can be demonstrated by checking with
a relatively obscure database. Although Conklin is skeptical about the
possibility of unifying all these databases, it seems plausible that they
could all be linked through the internet so a dealer wanting to check
title could do so quickly and easily. Additionally, if dealers and auc-
tion houses are required to warrant title to works they sell and to carry
who is mentally ill.
140 See id. at 257.
141 Id. at 258.
142 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 203. See also Borodkin, supra note 1; Fox, supra note 12;
Kelly, supra note 2, at 54; Lenzner, supra note 1; McGuire, supra note 12.
143 See Sarah S. Conley, International Art Theft 13 Wis. INT'L LJ. 493, 495 (1995).
144 See CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 262.
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insurance to cover such warranties, consumers will have little need to
check title independently.
In connection with these registries, Conklin advocates greater
publicity of art crimes, while acknowledging some of the potential
negative effects of such publicity. 45 He argues that owners who are
robbed should have to register the theft to toll the statute of limita-
tions.14 Although owners may be hesitant to register, given the nu-
merous disincentives collectors and museums believe they have in
disclosing such matters, 47 requiring such registration and condition-
ing good faith purchaser status on checking a central registry appor-
tions responsibility fairly between purchasers and theft victims based
upon the actions each of them can reasonably be expected to
undertake.
Conklin also recommends purchasers have works of art authenti-
cated before buying them.' 48 However, this seems unduly burden-
some on consumers and largely unnecessary if reforms are made at
the central points of distribution, dealers and auction houses. This
could be better accomplished by requiring an independent authenti-
cation before dealers and auction houses can sell works of art.
Conklin also appears to advocate France's position of destroying
counterfeit art works, as opposed to returning them to their rightful
owners.' 49 This is based on a perception that to return the counter-
feit work is like returning counterfeit money. However, unlike coun-
terfeit money (which has little use other than to defraud people),
counterfeit art can nonetheless be of considerable value to its owner
for aesthetic reasons.
Other suggestions include regulating dealers by requiring such
things as displaying prices and regulating auction houses so they are
more accountable for accepting suspicious materials.' 50 However,
both dealers and auction houses in the United States currently gener-
ally warrant title to items they sell, so the desired types of additional
accountability are somewhat unclear.
Conklin astutely notes that any country's legal reforms will be lim-
ited in its effects due to the international nature and scope of art
crime. 15' In spite of this position, Conklin believes art crimes should
145 Id. at 263.
146 Id. at 272.
147 See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
148 See CoNKLrN, supra note 1, at 264.
'49 Id.
150 Id. at 267-69.
151 Id. at 271.
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be more severely penalized. 152 Conklin argues for stiffer penalties
based on the value of art and the importance of art to society as a
whole. Additionally, given the infrequency with which people en-
gaged in art crimes are caught, stiffer penalties may also help deter art
crime.
Finally, Conklin discusses the police investigating units involved
in art crimes and some of their techniques. 153 The skeletal crews in-
volved in these endeavors make it easy to understand the Herculean
task of trying to stem art crime without additional resources.154 How-
ever, in this era of tight budgets and limited resources, the likelihood
of additional resources being allocated to this type of crime is remote.
X. CONCLUSION
Art Crime is an interesting book for its insights into the art world
as a whole and for the numerous anecdotes it describes. However,
John Conklin ultimately stops short of creating a conceptual frame-
work for analyzing art crime and discusses the laws affecting art crime
in a superficial manner. Through no fault of the author, the book has
little statistical evidence. Most of the analysis is either anecdotal in
nature or cursory, with ample descriptions of the various possibilities
and arguments pro and con, but little discussion of the relative merits
of these arguments and alternatives. Additionally, the book's exam-
ples become repetitive in the latter chapters.
Nevertheless, Art Crime calls attention to an area of law that needs
additional research and leaves the reader with a sense of having
learned a great deal about a world that seems inaccessible to many.
152 Id. at 275.
153 Id. at 276-80.
154 For example, only "two agents cover eleven million acres of Bureau of Land Manage-
ment territory" in New Mexico in connection with the Archaeological Resources Protec-
tion Act. CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 279.
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